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The law AN OUTLINE OF PARKING LEGISLATION AND OF CHECKS ON COUNCILS[1]
Page: 1/2
(First version 16 11 2005)
1. The
legal basis of controlled parking zones and parking enforcement is the Road
Traffic Regulation Act 1984. Section 122
subsection (1) as amended sets out the purposes of the powers provided in the
Act:-
“It shall be the duty of every local
authority upon whose functions are conferred by or under this Act so to
exercise the functions conferred on them by this Act (so far as practicable
having regard to the matters specified in sub-section (2) below) to secure the expeditious,
convenient and safe movement of vehicular and other traffic (including pedestrians) and the
provision of suitable and adequate parking facilities on and off the highway…”.
Under this Act, while local councils
were responsible for most traffic signs, traffic regulation and control of
parking, the police were responsible for appointing traffic wardens who
enforced parking offences through the criminal court system. The Act
(unfortunately) allows the enforcement authority to immobilize (i.e.) clamp,
and tow vehicles. The Act (section 55)
limits the purposes to which a local authority could spend any surplus
resulting from income from parking spaces; the first defines what you can do;
the second defines what you cannot do and lists all the restrictions in a road
or area, and is the document on which the council bases its right to enforce
the restrictions – The Traffic Management Act
2004 relaxed the ring fence for councils that do not require further
off-street parking stating (section 95(2)(d) “In the case of such local authorities as may be
prescribed, [an authority can use the surplus] any other purposes for which the
authority may lawfully incur expenditure”.
2. The Road
Traffic Act 1991 transferred responsibility for parking enforcement
to councils, “decriminalized” parking “offences” and brought them within the
civil enforcement system. Also a number of additional enforcement
responsibilities, such as restricted (yellow line) parking, were transferred from
the police to councils. Before any
council can take up decriminalised enforcement powers it must first prepare a
detailed proposal which is submitted to the Secretary of State for Transport.
Only once this has been approved and the council’s scheme is deemed to be
viable, will permission be given to prepare for and introduce a decriminalised
parking enforcement regime. Subsequently
a council has to prepare a Traffic Management Order and a Traffic Regulation
Order for each controlled parking zone.
3. Part
III of the Road
Traffic Act 1991 deals with traffic
in London.
Section
73 Road Traffic Act 1991 created Parking And Traffic
Appeals Service under the jurisdiction of a joint committee of the London authorities, previously the Parking
Committee For London which has become the Association of London Government
- Transport and Environment Committee.
Section
74 Road Traffic Act 1991 makes it the duty of the London authorities to set the levels for
of charges for penalties, removal and clamping having regard to the Secretary
of State’s parking guidance. No
equivalent obligation is imposed in relation to the setting of parking charges
to making charges for permits. Section
51 Road Traffic Act 1991 and Section
63 Road Traffic Act 1991 empower the Secretary of State to issue guidance
to London authorities with respect to the
management of traffic in London and with respect to parking.
4. Regrettably
the Act allows for clamping whenever a penalty charge can be made, a provision
which was clarified in the Traffic Management Act
2004 where section 79(1)(a) states “The appropriate national authority may
make provision by regulations for or in connection with: (a) the fixing of an
immobilisation device to a stationary vehicle found in any place where there is
reason to believe the vehicle has been permitted to remain at rest there in
circumstances in which a penalty charge has become payable”.
5. "Traffic Management
and Parking Guidance for London" published by the Secretary of State in
February 1998 explains the purposes of parking controls and enforcement (paras
2.4 and 2.5):- “Managing stationary vehicles is
just as important as managing moving vehicles.
Illegal and inconsiderate parking obstructs traffic and pedestrians, can
be a major obstacle to better conditions for all road users and can cause
congestion which in turn can exacerbate pollution. Parking restrictions assist the safe and free
flow of traffic and are particularly helpful in ensuring efficient bus
operations…Since 1991 the use of on- and off-street parking controls has
developed as an essential traffic restraint tool, especially for journeys to
central London…”
Para 2.7 states:-
“The Secretary of State therefore
expects that local authorities should assess parking provision and develop a
parking strategy which includes statements of parking and enforcement
priorities and quantifiable standards of performance, that these strategies
should be published and that the objectives for local parking controls should include
(inter alia):-
·
Introducing, strengthening or extending Controlled Parking Zones (CPZs)
in areas of parking congestion and which are important local destinations…”
Regarding the revenue to be raised from parking
charges, the Guidance states (para 2.23) that:-
“The level of parking charges must
be set for traffic management reasons, such as to ration available space and
ensure that there is a rapid turnover of parking places, rather than to
maximise revenue. This is because
section 122 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 does not include the
maximisation of revenue from parking charges as one of the relevant
considerations to be taken into account in securing safe, expeditious and
convenient movement of traffic”.
6. Mr.
Justice McCullough in his judgement Regina v Camden Borough Council ex parte
Mark Dyson, Gordon Cram and Others[2] examines the policy and objects of the 1984 Act. He observes (at p23) “Doing this [viz looking
at the objectives of the 1984 Act] makes clear that the 1984 Act is not a
fiscal measure. It contains no provision
which suggests that Parliament intended to authorise a council to raise income
by using its powers to designate parking places on the highway and to charge
for their use. To adapt words used by
Nolan LJ in R v Manchester City Council ex p King (1991) 89 LGR 696 at 712, had
this been the intention of Parliament to the extent of the fund-raising powers
conferred on the council would be enormous, since they have a monopoly over the
granting of permits for on-street parking within their area and would have
golden opportunities to augment their revenue…(at p24). All its provisions,
leaving aside section 55(4) for the moment, are concerned in one way or another
with the expeditious, convenient and safe movement of traffic and the provision
of suitable and adequate parking facilities on and off the highway. This is reflected in the wording of section
122(1). There is its policy; there are
its objects”. McCullough observes (at
p34) that “the fact that the 1984 Act is not a revenue raising Act. Where there is ambiguity the citizen is not
to be taxed unless the language of the legislation clearly imposes the
obligation”.
7. There is, however, an interesting
issue as to whether issuing penalties without going through a court process is
legal. The English Bill
Of Rights 1689 (which is titled “An Act declaring the rights and
liberties of the subject and settling the succession of the crown”) states “That all grants and
promises of fines and forfeitures of particular persons before conviction are
illegal and void”.
Some motorists (British
Weights And Measures - Bill of Rights Parking Ticket Campaign) have been objecting to PCNs citing the Bill of
Rights. If it were upheld then it would
have wider implications than parking enforcement, and would for example
prohibit the administrative fines levied by Customs & Excise and the Inland Revenue
for VAT and tax returns. The
arguments are set out on the website of Neil Herron, who is a former market
trader and is associated with the “metric martyrs”. (1.
2.
3.
4.).
CHECKS ON COUNCILS’ BEHAVIOUR
8. The
legislation has been designed to make it administratively easy and cheap for
councils to issue penalty charge notices and collect the penalties with nothing
so bothersome as a court standing between it and ultimately sending in the
bailiffs. There is PATAS, but that has limited powers – it can only rule on a
limited range of factual matters; it does not have the power to exercise the
discretion of commonsense. There are
some other checks on the behaviour of councils:-
·
By judicial review as to whether
actions they take are not in accord with their powers. Councils and bodies like PATAS, Transport for
London, the Local Government
Ombudsman, and the District Auditor are constructs of statute and have to act
within the law (intra vires). They can
be challenged if they act outside the law (ultra vires).
Baroness Joan Walmsley won a judicial review against PATAS regarding an
aspect of interpretation of the congestion charging legislation and of PATAS’s
powers of discretion, Walmsley Judicial Review Judgement 14 April 2005, Judicial reviews can be expensive
·
To the district auditor on the
grounds that either a council’s expenditure or its income is ultra vires, see Council's
Accounts your rights: England, The
Audit Commission. We have made an objection to the District Auditor that Camden’s
parking enforcement policies which generated a surplus of nearly £20m annually
are ultra vires.
· To the Local Government Ombudsman that a council’s
behaviour is maladministrative. The Local Government Ombudsman investigates
complaints of injustice from maladministration
by local authorities and certain other bodies.
Although there is no statutory definition of maladministration
the Minister in piloting the 1967 Act creating the Parliamentary Ombudsman
referred to “bias, neglect, inattention, delay, incompetence, ineptitude,
turpitude, arbitrariness, and so on”. The
Ombudsman provides a sort of alternative
to judicial review. The Ombudsman will
not consider issues for which there is a remedy provided, such as appealing to
PATAS, or when a person has taken a case to court. To appeal to the Local Government Ombudsman
one first has to make a complaint to the council, and have that complaint rejected. We have a complaint into Camden
that it has been maladministrative regarding
instructing bailiffs and then failing to control its agent.
While not
strictly a check itself, but more a means to checking, councils are subject to
the Freedom of
Information Act 2000 which we have used to good effect. Under the Act councils are supposed to
respond with the requested information within 20 days. Sometimes they pretend
that they have lost the information, or claim that it is confidential, or that
the cost exceeds the free threshold and is therefore prohibitively
expensive. Two of LMAG’s directors have
experienced similar difficulties with Camden
attempting to claim £700 to release requested information. One complained to the Information Commissioners
Office twice, who “encouraged” Camden
to release requested statistics in one case and ruled an Information
Commissioner Decision Notice: “In failing to provide all the information
requested until 23 March 2005,
Camden Council has not complied with section 10(1) of the Act.”
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